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Great Strategic Rivalries: From the Classical World 
to the Cold War, ed� James G� Lacey� New York: 
Oxford Univ� Press, 2016� 680 pages� $47�95�
Edited by James Lacey of the Marine 
Corps War College, this collection’s 
sixteen essays explore prolonged 
strategic rivalries, beginning with 
Athens, Sparta, and the Peloponnesian 
War, and ending with the Cold War 
rivalry between the Soviet Union and 
the United States� Each essay explores 
a rivalry’s nature and causes, the 
reasons it endured, how it ended, and 
its legacy� While some revisit well-
trodden ground, such as Paul A� Rahe’s 
discussion of the Peloponnesian War, 
others offer interesting new insights�
Sally Paine’s analysis of the three-sided 
struggle among China, Japan, and Russia 
for regional dominance highlights the 
importance of developing civic and eco-
nomic institutions to support military 
power, conducting long-term planning, 
securing allies, and focusing on the right 
enemies� Nineteenth-century China 
failed to do any of these, and reaped the 
consequences in a succession of military 
defeats and “unequal treaties�” Chinese 
leaders went to war with Britain and 
France—distant powers that posed little 
threat to China—instead of focusing on 
nearby and more dangerous Russia�
Kathleen M� Burk’s impressive essay 
on Great Britain and the United States 
illuminates a multifaceted rivalry 
that involved both cooperation and 
competition and was often more 
commercial than military� Its slow, 
peaceful end in the twentieth century 
made it particularly unusual, as British 
leaders urged the United States to 
assume primary responsibility for 
regions critical to British security�
In contrast, Christine Shaw’s analysis 
of Genoa and Venice demonstrates 
that commercial rivalries can be quite 
bloody, involving not only conventional 
military operations but raids on trade 
quarters in foreign ports and piracy� 
Despite their bitter rivalry, Genoa 
and Venice too sometimes fought the 
same enemies, as when both joined the 
Holy League to fight the Ottomans�
Kenneth W� Harl’s analysis of the long 
rivalry between Rome and the Parthians 
and Persians underlines geography’s 
enduring influence� Defeat of one 
enemy can pave the way for a new, 
more powerful one, such as Sassanid 
Persia� The Ottoman Turks, in turn, 
inherited Byzantium and Rome’s 
rivalry with Persia, and faced the same 
strategic problem of securing borders 
and waging war in an arid region�
Kelly R� DeVries explores the role of 
secondary powers in these rivalries 
by examining Anglo-French rivalry 
during the Middle Ages� Maintaining 
the wool trade required English rulers 
to support rebellions and wars by the 
Low Countries against France, the Holy 
Roman Empire, and Spain� Similarly, 
English campaigning focused on secur-
ing and defending the port of Calais so 
England could control both ends of the 
wool trade� Hoping to weaken England, 
Scotland and Wales aided France�
Matt Schumann and Michael V� 
Leggiere cover the later stages of the 
Anglo-French rivalry, in which Britain 
prevailed owing to superior economic 
and maritime power, though not without 
committing substantial troops to 
fight on the European continent� Like 
DeVries, both authors adroitly blend 
discussions of military and economic 
factors� Leggiere’s cost-benefit analysis 
of Napoleon’s Continental System 
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and its effect on global trade is par-
ticularly thorough and well argued�
Troubled by distance, information 
overload, and numerous local rivals 
to their scattered holdings, the Haps-
burgs, Geoffrey Parker notes, were 
almost always at war, often in different 
places against different enemies� Their 
empire’s status as the leading Catholic 
power further complicated the strategic 
situation and influenced important 
strategic decisions� Despite the logistical 
and operational problems the Spanish 
Armada faced, Philip II believed that 
divine favor would bring it victory 
against England� Religion often proved 
less an obstacle to the Hapsburgs’ rivals, 
as demonstrated by France’s alliance 
with the Ottoman Empire, which 
Andrew Wheatcroft’s essay details�
Geoffrey Wawro, Williamson Murray, 
William M� Morgan, Robert M� Citino, 
and James H� Anderson, respectively, ex-
plore more-recent rivalries: France ver-
sus Germany, Britain versus Germany, 
the United States versus Japan, Germany 
versus Russia, and the United States 
versus the Soviet Union� Citino places 
the Nazi-Soviet pact in the historical 
context of earlier partitions of Poland 
and argues that “German-Russian 
strategic rivalry was the real and proxi-
mate cause of World War I” (p� 465)�
Lacey’s introduction ties the essays 
together and highlights their com-
monalities, such as the economic and 
financial systems needed to support 
protracted rivalries� Rivalries often begin 
and end with shocks to the international 
system, such as the rise of new powers 
or the collapse of old ones; examples 
include the Athenian-Spartan rivalry 
that arose after the Persian threat to 
Greece receded and the long-standing 
Anglo-French rivalry that ended when 
Germany arose as a new threat to both 
nations� Fear, honor, and interest—
categories introduced by Thucydides 
in his history of the Peloponnesian 
War—cause rivalries to endure�
Strategic rivalry is a topic worthy of 
more research, particularly since, as 
Lacey notes, disputes between enduring 
rivals are twice as likely to lead to war 
as disputes between nations without 
a history of rivalry� The breadth and 
depth of this book’s essays make it an 
excellent choice for a course text�
STEPHEN K� STEIN
Churchill & Orwell: The Fight for Freedom, by 
Thomas E� Ricks� New York: Penguin, 2017� 352 
pages� $28�
George Orwell and Winston S� Churchill 
do not strike us as two men whose 
surnames would share a dust jacket� 
One only has to look at David Levine’s 
clever caricatures in the New York 
Review of Books for two entirely different 
men to appear: Orwell the rustic, in 
tweeds, chewing on a piece of hay; and 
Churchill, clad in coronation robes, 
the king of his own dominion� Yet 
Thomas Ricks, a journalist formerly 
at the Washington Post, has written 
an interesting book, a dual biography 
of sorts that claims that the men had 
much in common as they fought 
fascism and Communism, two of the 
greatest evils of the twentieth century�
Ricks focuses on the “fulcrum” years 
of Orwell’s and Churchill’s lives—the 
1930s and 1940s� And this is just as 
well, because if they had died before 
1940 they would be remembered little 
today, if at all� A sniper’s bullet almost 
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